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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARK ERICKSON,
Plaintiff/Appellee/CrossAppellant,

:

vs.

::

Case No. 930283-CA

:
:

Priority No. 15

RONALD K. PLATTS, dba
E-Z STREET AUTO,
Defendant/Appellant/CrossAppellee.

:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
In this appeal and cross-appeal, Defendant/Appellant/CrossAppellee Ronald K. Platts dba E-Z Street Auto

("E-Z

Street")

appeals from a judgment entered against him after a bench trial for
violation of the federal odometer fraud statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1981
et seq., and for fraud.

Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Mark

Erickson ("Erickson") cross-appeals that judgment claiming that he
should have been awarded three times the amount of actual damages
he sustained, as provided for under 15 U.S.C. § 1989. This Court
has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(d) (1992).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Cross-Appellant identifies the following issues on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court correctly deny Erickson's claim for

damages in the amount of three times his actual damages as provided
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (federal odometer fraud statute)?
This issue is a question of statutory interpretation, which is
reviewed

under

a

correction

of

error

standard,

deference to the trial court's interpretation.

according

no

Scharf v. BMG Corp.

700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc.
v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979).
2.

Did the trial court correctly construe 15 U.S.C. § 1988

to enter judgment against E-Z Street for purposefully professing
ignorance regarding the exact mileage of the vehicle, and thus
showing a reckless disregard for the truth?
This issue is a question of statutory interpretation, which is
reviewed

under

a

correction

of

error

standard,

deference to the trial court's interpretation.

according

no

Scharf v. BMG Corp.

700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc.
v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979).
3.

Did the trial court correctly grant Erickson the remedy

of rescission of the Purchase Agreement?
This issue is a question of law and will be reviewed using a
correction of error standard.

Scharf v. BMG Corp. 700 P.2d 1068

(Utah 1985); Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service
Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
§ 1981.

Congressional findings and declaration of purpose

The Congress hereby finds that purchasers when
buying motor vehicles rely heavily on the odometer
reading as index of the condition and value of such
vehicle; that purchasers are entitled to rely on the
odometer reading as an accurate reflection of the mileage
actually traveled by the vehicle; that an accurate
indication of the mileage traveled by a motor vehicles
assists the purchaser in determining its safety and
reliability; and that motor vehicles move in the current
of interstate and foreign commerce or affect such
commerce. It is therefore the purpose of this subchapter
to prohibit tampering with odometers on motor vehicles
and to establish certain safeguards for the protection of
purchaser with respect to the sale of motor vehicles
having altered or reset odometers.
(Pub.L. 92-513, Title IV, § 401, Oct. 20, 1972, 86 Stat.
961. )
§ 1988.
Disclosure requirements
ownership of motor vehicle

upon

transfer

of

Promulgation of rules
(a) Not later than 90 days after October 20, 1972, the
Secretary shall prescribe rules requiring any transferor
to give the following written disclosure to the
transferee in connection with the transfer of ownership
of a motor vehicle:
(1) Disclosure of the cumulative mileage
registered on the odometer.
(2) Disclosure that the actual mileage is
unknown, if the odometer reading is known to
the transferor to be different from the number
of miles the vehicle has actually traveled.
Such rules shall prescribe the manner in which
information shall be disclosed under this section and in
which such information shall be retained.
Violation of rules and
transferees prohibited

giving

false

statements

to

(b)
No transferor shall violate any rule prescribed
under this section or give a false statement to a
transferee in making any disclosure required by such
rule.
3

Acceptance
of
incomplete
written
disclosure
by
transferees acquiring ownership for resale prohibited
(c) No transferee who, for purposes of resale, acquires
ownership of a motor vehicle shall accept any written
disclosure required by any rule prescribed under this
section if such disclosure is incomplete.
(Pub.L. 92-513, Title IV, § 408, Oct. 20, 1972, 86 Stat.
962; Pub.L. 94-364, Title Iv, § 406, July 14, 1976, 90
Stat. 983.)
§ 1989. Civil actions to enforce liability for violation
of
odometer
requirements;
amount
of
damages;
jurisdiction; period of limitation
(a) Any person who, with intent to defraud, violates any
requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be liable
in an amount equal to the sum of (1) three times the amount of actual damaqes
sustained or $1,500.00 whichever is the
greater; and
(2) in the case of any successful action to
enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of
the action together with reasonable attorney
fees as determined by the court.
(b) An action to enforce any liability created under
subsection (a) of this section, may be brought in a
United States district court without regard to the amount
in controversy, or in any other court of competent
jurisdiction within two years from the date on which the
liability arises.
(Pub.L. 92-513, Title IV, § 409, Oct. 20, 1972, 86 Stat. 963.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Erickson filed his complaint in this matter on January 10,
1990, alleging that Appellant defrauded him in the sale of a
vehicle that had 146,811 actual miles on it, but was sold as having
approximately 46,811.

On January 18, 1990, E-Z Street filed a

verified answer denying Erickson's claims and counterclaiming for
damages arising out of breach of contract.
The case was tried before the Honorable LeRoy H. Griffiths,
sitting without a jury, on September 29, 1992 and October 19, 1992
4

(R. 92). On November 24, 1992, Judge Griffiths issued a Memorandum
Decision in favor of Erickson and against E-Z Street (R. 85-88).
On February 1, 1993, Judge Griffiths signed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and an Order of judgment (R. 92-98).

Erickson

was awarded (1) judgment against E-Z Street; (2) rescission of the
Purchase Agreement

for the vehicle;

(3) cancellation

of his

obligation evidenced by his credit card charges for purchase of the
vehicle; (4) damages of $1,212.80, plus interest at the rate of 10%
per annum from December 1, 1989 until paid in full; (5) court costs
of $104.00; and (6) $1,500.00 attorney's fees (R. 99-100).

No

punitive damages were awarded (id.).
On February 11, 1993, E-Z Street made a Motion to Alter and
Amend the Judgment and for a New Trial, which was denied on March
18, 1993. E-Z Street filed its notice of appeal in the Court of
Appeals on April 22, 1993 (R. 123). Erickson cross-appealed on
April 28, 1993 (R. 125).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In September 1989, E-Z Street offered a 1980 Volkswagen camper
van ("vehicle") for sale (R. 85, 92 ). 1

On or about September 26,

1989, Erickson purchased the vehicle from E-Z Street.

Erickson

agreed to pay a total purchase price of $4,291.00 ($4,266.00, plus
$25.00 for an out of state permit).

Erickson paid for the

vehicle's purchase using two credit cards.
1

Erickson charged

All the statements in the Statement of Facts come from the
Memorandum Decision dated November 24, 1992 (contained in the
record at 85-88, and in this brief in Appendix I), and from the
Findings and Conclusions of Law (contained in the record at 92-98,
and in this Brief in Appendix I).
5

$1,291.00 on his American Express card and $3,000.00 on his Visa
card (R. 86, 93) .
Approximately

one week prior to purchasing the vehicle,

Erickson test drove the vehicle accompanied by one of E-Z Street's
salesman, Paul Lives. While on the test drive, Erickson stopped at
his father-in-law's home.
inspected the vehicle.

Erickson's wife and his father-in-law

At this time the odometer indicated that

the mileage on the vehicle was approximately 48,800 miles.

Even

though the vehicle was relatively old, given the low mileage shown
on the odometer and the condition of the body, the three felt that
the vehicle was in good condition (R. 86-87, 93).
Erickson and Mr. Lives specifically discussed the mileage
shown on the odometer. Erickson testified that Mr. Lives told him
that the miles shown were the actual miles.

Mr. Lives testified

that he told Erickson to have the vehicle checked by a mechanic
because there was "no way" to determine the actual mileage on a car
that old.
During the week prior to the vehicle's purchase, Erickson
spoke with E-Z Street's manager, Ronald Memmott, regarding purchase
terms. Both Erickson and his wife testified that Mr. Memmott told
them that the 48,831 miles, as shown on the vehicle's odometer,
were the actual miles of the vehicle (R. 87-88, 93-94).
On September 26, 1989, Mr. Memmott, on behalf of E-Z Street,
finalized the vehicle's purchase with Erickson.

Mr. Memmott

prepared all of the necessary documents transferring ownership of
the vehicle to Erickson.

Mr. Memmott prepared the Purchase
6

Agreement on which he indicated the vehicle's mileage as 48,831.
Mr. Memmott prepared the Odometer Disclosure Statement which stated
in pertinent part:
I, E.Z. Street Auto, state that the odometer . . . now
reads 48,831 (no tenths) miles and to the best of my
knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the
vehicle . . . unless one of the following statements is
checked.
(1)1 hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the
odometer reading reflects the amount of mileage in excess
of its mechanical limits.
X
(2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT the
actual mileage.

WARNING ODOMETER DISCREPANCY.

Mr. Memmott checked statement box by number (2) of the Odometer
Disclosure

Statement.

At

trial, Mr. Memmott

denied

that

he

misrepresented the mileage of the vehicle to Erickson, even though
he knew that the actual mileage was far in excess of 48,831 miles.
When statement

(2) was checked, people were put on notice that

there was an odometer discrepancy.

However, Erickson and his wife

both testified that Mr. Memmott told both of them that 48,831 was
the actual mileage on the vehicle (86-88, 93-94).
Erickson bought the vehicle "as is" and signed statements that
he realized the vehicle was sold without any warranties.

However,

Erickson believed he was purchasing an automobile with only 48,831
miles on it, not a vehicle with 148,831 and no warranty.

Erickson

drove the vehicle to his home in Evanston, Wyoming, and during the
first week of operation he repaired the brakes, tail lights, door
locks, and installed a new door rear-view mirror, all at a cost of
$123.24 (R. 86-87, 94-95).
At the beginning of the second week, Erickson, his wife, and
their one yaar old daughter, left Evanston to drive to Los Angeles,
7

California. Approximately 80 miles north of Las Vegas, Nevada the
vehicle broke down and had to be towed to Las Vegas. While in Las
Vegas, Erickson was told by a Volkswagen repair shop that the
engine

needed

a

complete

overhaul

at

an

estimated

cost of

$2,000.00. He was also told that from the condition of the engine
it was evident that the actual mileage was greatly in excess of the
mileage figure shown on the odometer (id. ).
To avoid ruining their trip to California, Erickson rented a
car in Las Vegas and continued traveling to Los Angeles. On their
return trip, Erickson rented a truck large enough to tow the
vehicle and brought it back to his father-in-law's home in South
Salt Lake, Utah.

It cost $150.34 to rent the car and $939.22 to

rent the truck (id. ).
Erickson's father-in-law, who is an experienced Volkswagen
mechanic, disassembled part of the engine in an attempt to repair
it.

The engine showed evidence of many miles of use, and he

determined that a complete engine overhaul was necessary.
Erickson's negotiations to have E-Z Street repair the engine were
unsuccessful.

E-Z Street insisted that under its "as-is, no

warranty" contract, E-Z Street had no legal obligation to repair
the engine.

Erickson testified, however, that he would not have

purchased the vehicle "as is, no warranty" if he had known the
mileage was over 100,000 miles.

The trial court concluded that

E-Z Street's agents knew or should have known that the odometer had
"turned over" and that the actual mileage was 100,000 miles more
than was shown on the odometer. The trial court further concluded
8

that E-Z Street should have written the actual mileage on the
Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase Agreement (R. 87-88,
96-98) .
Erickson, upon finding an old registration form, discovered
the name of the previous owners of the 1980 van.

The previous

owners informed Erickson that the actual mileage of the van, when
they sold it, was 146,811 miles (R. 96; Appendix II of this Brief).
The Court specifically found that as of January of 1989, E-Z Street
knew or should have known that the odometer had turned over (R.
97).

As a result of E-Z Street's failure to disclose this

information, and as a result of E-Z Street's choice to "profess
ignorance as to the actual mileage," the trial court further
specifically found that "Defendant, through the actions of its
agents, committed fraud on the plaintiff" (R. 97-98).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it did not grant Erickson three
times the amount of his actual damages, as required by 15 U.S.C. §
1989(a).

However, the trial court did not commit any error in

judging that E-Z Street violated 15 U.S.C. § 1988, or in rescinding
the purchase agreement for the vehicle.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ERICKSON'S CLAIM FOR
TREBLE DAMAGES PURSUANT TO 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (FEDERAL
ODOMETER FRAUD STATUTE).
Erickson is entitled to treble damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1989,
and the trial court erred in not awarding such damages.
9

Section

1989 states:
(a) Any person who, with intent to defraud, violates any
requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be liable
in an amount equal to the sum of (1) three times the amount of actual damages
sustained or $1,500.00 whichever is the
greater; and
(2) in the case of any successful action to
enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of
the action together with reasonable attorney
fees as determined by the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1989.
mandatory terms:

The language of this section is couched in
Any person who has violated any requirement of

subchapter IV—the odometer disclosure requirements--(15 U.S.C. §§
1981-91) shall be liable in the amount of three times the amount of
actual damages or $1,500, whichever is greater.2

The trial court

only awarded Erickson $1,212.80 in damages. This is less than the
statutory minimum amount of $1,500.

Furthermore, three times the

amount of Erickson's actual damages would be $3,638.40 ($1,212.80
time three).

The plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 1989 requires that

the court award Erickson the greater of $1,500 or $3,638.40.
Erickson respectfully submits that the trial court erred, as a
matter of law, in awarding less than the statute mandates on its
own plain terms.
Accordingly, Erickson respectfully moves this Court to remand
this case to the trial court with an Order stating that the amount
of damages awarded to Erickson shall be entered as $3,638.40.

2

The statute also provides for reasonable attorney's fees to
a party who is successful in enforcing liability under the
subchapter, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1981-91.
10

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONSTRUED 15 U.S.C. § 1988 TO
ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST E-Z STREET FOR PURPOSEFULLY
PROFESSING IGNORANCE REGARDING THE EXACT MILEAGE OF THE
VEHICLE.
The trial court correctly applied the law regarding violations
of 15 U.S.C. § 1988 in the present case.

Section 1988(a)(1)

requires that any transferor "give the following written disclosure
to the transferee in connection with the transfer of ownership of
a

motor

vehicle:

(1) Disclosure

registered on the odometer."

of

the

cumulative

mileage

Furthermore, § 1988(b) states:

"No

transferor shall violate any rule prescribed under this section or
give a false statement to a transferee in making any disclosure
required by such rule." 15. U.S.C. § 1988(b). In interpreting the
requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1988, the trial court relied on Ryan v.
Edwards, 592 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1979), and Haynes v. Manning, 917
F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1990).
approvingly.

In Haynes, the Tenth Circuit cited Ryan

E-Z Street's claim that the trial court erred in

applying 15 U.S.C. § 1988 is thus meritless.
In Ryan, the Fourth Circuit held that a transferor may certify
the mileage of a vehicle as unknown (i.e., check the box that E-Z
Street checked) only when he believes that for a reason other than
the odometer has "rolled over" the mileage is inaccurate. 592 F.2d
at 760-61. In Ryan, the defendant auto dealership had in its files
information that indicated that the vehicle at issue had over
100,000 miles on it.

Nevertheless, when the defendant sold the

automobile, it did not state this on the odometer discloser
statement. Rather, the dealership merely marked the second box on
11

the form that states that the true mileage is unknown.

Id. at 759.

In addressing the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1988(a) and (b),
the Fourth Circuit held that a transferor has a legal duty to use
reasonable care to determine the exact amount of miles traveled by
the vehicle.

Id. at 760-61.

Specifically, the court held that the

defendant did not comply with the requirements of § 1988 by simply
recording the mileage that the odometer stated.

Id. at 761.

The

Court wrote:
When a transferor who knows that an odometer has
"turned over" merely records the numbers appearing on the
odometer and certifies that the true mileage is unknown,
the consumer is not simply deprived of accurate mileage
information; he is actually misled by the form itself.
We cannot believe that Congress intended to enact a
statute requiring that consumers be given false or
misleading information.
We hold that when a transferor knows that a
vehicle's odometer has "turned over" after registering
99,999 miles, the "cumulative mileage" which must be
stated to satisfy the requirements of § 1988(a)(1) is the
total of 100,000 plus the number actually appearing on
the odometer. A transferor may certify the mileage as
"unknown", § 1988(a)(2), only when he believes that, for
some other reason, the odometer reading is inaccurate.
Id. at 760-61 (emphasis added).

The Court further explained the

level of certainty a car dealer must possess regarding whether an
odometer has "rolled over":
which

the transferor must

"The knowledge of the 'turn over'
have

assumed by the district court.

is not the absolute

certitude

If, in the exercise of reasonable

care, he would have had reason to know that the odometer had
* turned over', he must disclose this fact on the odometer mileage
statement."

Id. at 761 n.5 (citing Nieto v. Pence, 578 F.2d 640

(5th Cir. 1978) and Senate Report No. 92-413, Reprinted in 1972
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 3960, 3971).
12

The Tenth Circuit agreed with the reasoning of Ryan in its
opinion in Haynes v. Manning, 917 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1990).

In

that case, the court stated if a defendant sold a vehicle with
reckless disregard to the actual miles the vehicle had traveled,
that such actions violated 15 U.S.C. § 1988.

Id. at 452-53 (citing

Ryan v. Edwards, 592 F.2d 756, 762 (4th Cir. 1979)).
In the present case, the trial court specifically held that
E-Z Street had disregarded its duty to ascertain, with reasonable
care, the correct odometer reading of the vehicle.

The court

stated:
4.
There is a conflict in the evidence as to
whether Defendant's salesman and manager told Plaintiff
that the Vehicle's mileage was 100,000 miles less than
the actual mileage. However, the court concludes that
from January, 1989, Defendant's agents knew or should
have known that the odometer had "turned over" and that
the actual mileage was 100,000 miles more than as shown
on the odometer.
5. This information was not given to the plaintiff.
Mr. Memmott should have checked statement (1), and
written the actual mileage on the Odometer Disclosure
Statement and the Purchase Agreement.
[W]hen a transferor knows that a vehicle's odometer
has "turned over" after registering 99,999 miles,
the "cumulative mileage" which must be stated to
satisfy the reguirements of (the Act) is the total
of 100,000 plus the number actually appearing on
the odometer."
Ryan v. Edwards, 592 P.2d 760.
6. What the agents did do was to profess ignorance
as to the actual mileage.
Such conduct mislead the
plaintiff and constitutes reckless disregard for the
truth if not actual intent to defraud.
7. The court concludes that Defendant, through the
actions of its agents, committed fraud on the plaintiff.
(R. 97-98).
The holding of the trial thus correctly stated that E-Z Street
13

committed fraud by purposefully not exercising reasonable care to
learn the exact mileage of the vehicle.

This violation was all the

more egregious when it came to light that E-Z Street had signed a
document that stated the actual miles of the vehicle (R. 74, in the
envelop containing the exhibits; see Appendix II of this Brief).
Even

the

lead

case

E-Z

Street

cites

in

support

of

its

position, Nieto v. Pence, 578 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1978), accords
with the holding of the Ryan case.

In Nieto, the Fifth Circuit

stated:
We hold that a transferor who lacked actual knowledge may
still be found to have intended to defraud and thus may
be civilly liable for a failure to disclose that a
vehicle's actual mileage is unknown. A transferor may
not close his eyes to the truth.
If a transferor
reasonably should have known that a vehicle's odometer
reading was incorrect, although he did not know to a
certainty the transferee would be defrauded, a court may
infer that he understood the risk of such an occurrence.
Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, Erickson respectfully asks this Court to affirm
the trial court's judgment that E-Z

Street violated

15 U.S.C.

§ 1988.
POINT III.
E-Z STREET'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
REQUIRING PROOF OF FRAUD BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
BEFORE GRANTING RESCISSION OF THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT IS
WITHOUT MERIT.
The trial court's decision to grant rescission of the purchase
agreement of the vehicle should be sustained on three grounds.
First,

the

trial

court

ruled

that

E-Z

Street

had

defrauded

Erickson, and the evidence is clear and convincing that E-Z Street
had signed a document ttat stated the actual miles of the vehicle
14

to be 146,811 as of March 2, 1989.

See Appendix II.

Therefore,

the trial court's decision is consistent with Pace v. Parrish, 247
P.2d 273 (Utah 1952).

Second, E-Z Street did not provide a record

to this court to review.

Without such a record, this Court will

presume that the evidence below
actions.

supported the trial court's

Intermountain Power Agency v. Bowers-Irons Recreation

Land & Cattle Co., 786 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App. 1990).

Third, on

the grounds of unilateral mistake, the trial court, in equity,
could grant the rescission.
Regarding the first argument, the trial specifically stated
that it found that E-Z Street's actions defrauded Erickson (R. 9798).

The court stated that E-Z Street's actions "constituted

reckless disregard for the truth if not actual intent to defraud"
(R. 97, emphasis added).

Without even making recourse to the oral

evidence offered at trial, Erickson introduced a document that
demonstrated that the actual miles on the vehicle were 146,811.
This document was signed by an agent of E-Z Street.
Regarding the nine elements of fraud, as explained in Pace,
each element was met by clear and convincing evidence in this case.
First, E-Z Street misrepresented the mileage of the vehicle.
Second, Erickson testified that the mileage was a material fact in
considering whether to buy to the car. Moreover, 15 U.S.C. § 1981
and State v. Forshee, 588 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1978) (holding that
mileage on an odometer is likely to affect the judgment of the
buyer and has a pecuniary significance) both hold that the mileage
of a vehicle is material to its purchase.
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Third, the statement

that the exact mileage was unknown was false.

Fourth, E-Z Street

either made the statement with reckless disregard for the truth, or
actively intended to defraud Erickson.

Fifth, the purpose for

making the statements were to induce Erickson to buy the vehicle.
Sixth, Erickson reasonable relied on such representation. He
took the vehicle to his father-in-law, but without disassembling
the engine, there was no way to know the approximate mileage of the
car. The trial court even stated that "Even though the vehicle was
relatively old, with low mileage shown on the odometer and the
condition of the body, the three felt that
mechanical condition" (R. 85, emphasis added).

it was

in good

Seventh, Erickson

did buy the car in reliance on the representation of the mileage.
Eighth, Erickson was induced to take this action because of the
representation.

And ninth, Erickson was damaged in the value of

the vehicle he received and the damages he suffered when the
vehicle broke down.

All the elements of fraud have been met by

clear and convincing evidence.
A second ground why the trial court's remedy of rescission
should be affirmed is that E-Z Street has not produced a record of
the proceedings

in this matter and is therefore barred from

bringing arguments regarding the Court's findings and conclusions.
Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2) states:
Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged
findings or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge
on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by
or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall
include in the record a transcript of all evidence
relevant to such finding or conclusion.
In Intermountain Power Agei.cv v. Bowers-Irons Recreation Land &
16

Cattle Co., 786 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App. 1990), this Court stated
that without a record on appeal, this Court can only presume that
the judgment was supported by sufficient evidence. Erickson urges
this Court to follow this presumption in the present case, to
decline to reach E-Z Street's argument, and to affirm the trial
court's order of rescission of the purchase agreement.
A third and final ground for affirming the trial court's order
granting rescission is that, at the very least, Erickson entered
into the purchase agreement under a mistaken belief of fact
regarding the mileage of the vehicle. Obviously E-Z Street did not
have clean hands in this matter, and on the basis of Erickson's
unilateral mistake, the purchase agreement should, in justice and
equity, be rescinded.
Pursuant

to

the

arguments

above,

Erickson

respectfully

petitions this Court to affirm the trial court's Order and Judgment
granting rescission of the purchase agreement.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Erickson respectfully
requests this Court to remand the case to the trial court with an
Order to enter judgment for Erickson in the amount of $3,638.40,
plus interest at ten percent (10%), to award attorney's fees and
costs for this appeal, and to affirm the trial court's order and
judgment in all other respects.
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APPENDIX I

Third Judicial Circuit Court Of Salt Lake County

Murray Department, State of Utah

MARK ERICKSON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 903000298

E Z STREET AUTO SALES,
Defendant.
In this action, the court is called upon to construe the mileage disclosure requirements
as they apply to an odometer which has "turned over" after registering 100,000 miles. The
testimony presented at the trial is convoluted and each party challenges the others accuracy as
to what occurred. Upon consideration of all the evidence, the court finds for the plaintiff as
hereinafter set forth.
September, 1989, defendant, E Z Street Auto Sales offered a 1980 Volkswagen
Camper Van for sale. The record is not clear when defendant acquired this vehicle for sale,
but the facts establish that defendant had it inspected on January 25, 1989. The inspection
certificate indicates that the owner is E Z Street Auto Sales and the mileage was 46,811
miles. An affidavit filed with the Motor Vehicle Department of the State of Utah by the
previous owners, Steven P. and Robyn Duncan, conveying the vehicle to defendant, indicates
that the actual odometer reading was 146,811 miles.
On September 26, 1989, the plaintiff, Mark Erickson, purchased the Camper Van
from the defendant. Approximately one week prior to the sale date, plaintiff had test-driven
the vehicle. Paul Lives, a salesman for defendant, accompanied plaintiff on the test-drive.
Plaintiff stopped at his father-in-law's home which is only a short distance from defendant's
lot. Plaintiffs wife and father-in-law inspected the vehicle. At this time, the odometer
showed the mileage to be around 48,800 miles. Even though the vehicle was relatively old,
with the low mileage shown on the odometer and the condition of the body, the three felt that
it was in good mechanical condition.

ss

Plaintiff and Mr. Lives discussed the mileage as shown on the odometer. Plaintiff
remembers that Mr. Lives said the miles shown were the actual miles. Mr. Lives
remembers the conversation differently. He testified that he told plaintiff to have the vehicle
checked by a mechanic since there was no way to determine the actual mileage on a car that
old. During the week plaintiff talked on the phone with Ronald Memmott, the manager of
defendant. The two mostly talked about the sale price of the vehicle. Mr. Memmott never
told plaintiff what the actual mileage was.
On the date of the sale Mr. Memmott handled the negotiations for defendant. Both
Federal and State law require that the seller state the mileage of the vehicle upon transfer of
ownership. The Odometer Disclosure Statement is the document that conveys this
information. Mr. Memmott prepared all of the necessary documents of sale. On the
Purchase Agreement, on the line asking for the odometer reading, Mr. Memmott wrote
48,831. The Odometer Disclosure Statement, as completed by Mr. Memmott, states the
odometer "now reads 48,831 (no tenths) miles and to the best of my knowledge
that it reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle....unless one of the following statements is
checked.
(1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading
reflects the amount of mileage in excess of its mechanical limits.
(2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT the actual mileage.
WARNING - ODOMETER DISCREPANCY."
Mr. Memmott checked statement (2). Mr. Memmott denies that he misrepresented the
mileage of the vehicle to plaintiff, even though he knew that the actual mileage was not
48,831 miles. When statement (2) was checked, people were put on notice that there was an
odometer discrepancy. Both plaintiff and his wife testified that Mr. Memmott told them that
the 48,831 miles, as shown on the odometer, were the actual miles of the vehicle.
Plaintiff agreed to pay a total purchase price of $4,291.00 ($4,266.00, plus $25.00
for an out of state permit). Plaintiff paid for the purchase by using two credit cards by
charging $3,000.00 on one card and $1,291.00 on the second. Plaintiff bought the vehicle
"as is" and signed statements that he realized the vehicle was sold without any warranties.
Plaintiff drove the vehicle to his home in Evanston, Wyoming. During the first week
of operation he repaired the brakes, tail lights, and door locks, and installed a new door
rear-view mirror, all at a cost of $123.24. At the beginning of the second week, plaintiff,
his wife, and one year old daughter left Evanston to drive to Los Angeles, California. The
car broke down about 80 miles north of Las Vegas, Nevada. It was towed to Las Vegas.
Plaintiff was told by a Volkswagen repair shop that the engine needed a complete overhaul.
That the cost of such an overhaul would be in the neighborhood of $2,000.00. He was also
told that from the condition of the engine it was evident that the actual mileage was greatly
in excess of the mileage figure shown on the odometer.

t*

So as not to ruin their vacation trip to California, plaintiff rented a car in Las Vegas
and continued on to Los Angeles. On their return trip, plaintiff rented a truck large enough
to tow the Camper Van and brought it back to his father-in-law's home in South Salt Lake,
Utah. It cost $150.34 to rent the car and $939.22 to rent the truck. The father-in-law, who
is an experienced Volkswagen mechanic, disassembled part of the engine in an attempt to
repair it. The engine showed evidence of many miles of use, and he determined that a
complete engine overhaul was necessary.
Plaintiff was able to discover the name of the previous owners of the 1980 van. They
informed him that the actual mileage of the van, when they sold it, was 146,811 miles.
Plaintiff 's negotiations to have the defendant repair the engine were unsuccessful. Defendant
insisted that under it's "as-is, no warranty" contract it had no legal obligation to repair the
engine. Plaintiff testified that he would not have purchased the vehicle "as is, no warranty"
if he had known the mileage was over 100,000 miles. It is plaintiffs contention that Mr.
Memmott knew or should have known that the correct mileage was 148,831 miles. That
defendant committed fraud when both its salesman and manager misrepresented the actual
mileage of the vehicle. That by putting the odometer reading of 48,831 miles on the
Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase Agreement, defendant violated the Federal
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1991 (federal
odometer statute).
The U. S. Congress in § 1981 stated its findings that purchasers, when buying
motor vehicles, rely heavily on the odometer reading as an index of the condition and value
of such vehicle; that purchasers are entitled to rely on the odometer reading as an accurate
reflection of the mileage actually traveled by the vehicle; that an accurate indication of the
mileage traveled by a motor vehicle assists the purchaser in determining its safety and
reliability. In actions brought under this act, courts have enforced strict accountability on
any person transferring ownership of a vehicle. The standard of proof in actions based on
fraud is the preponderance of evidence standard. The "intent to defraud" required for a
violation includes action taken with reckless disregard, as well as action taken with the
specific intent to deceive or cheat potential purchasers. See Ryan vs. Edwards. 592 F 2d 756
(1979): Haynes vs. Manning. 917 F2d 450 (1990).
In Utah, it is recognized that the mileage on the odometer of a used car is a factor
which is likely to affect the judgment of the buyer and has pecuniary significance. State v.
Forshee. 588 P.2d 181. Plaintiff testified that he would have made a different deal, or no
deal at all, had he known the actual mileage of the vehicle.
There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether defendant's salesman and manager
told the plaintiff that the mileage of the vehicle was 100,00 miles less than the actual
mileage. However, the court finds that from January, 1989, defendant's agents knew or

%?

should have known that the odometer had "turned over" and that the actual mileage was
100,000 miles iflore than as shown on the odometer. This information was not given to the
plaintiff. Mr. Memmott should have checked statement (1), and written the actual mileage
on the Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase Agreement.
"...when a transferor knows that a vehicle's odometer has "turned over" after
registering 99,999 miles, the "cumulative mileage" which must be stated to satisfy
the requirements of [the Act] is the total of 100,000 plus the numbef actually
appearing on the odometer." Ryan v. Edwards. 592 P2d 760.
What the agents did do was to profess ignorance as to the actual mileage. Such conduct
mislead the plaintiff and constitutes reckless disregard for the truth if not actual intent to
defraud.
The couft finds that defendant, through the actions of its agents, coitmiitted fraud on
the plaintiff. Plaintiff is granted judgment against the defendant as follows: (1) The Purchase
Agreement is rescinded. Plaintiffs obligation, as evidenced by the credit card charges, is
cancelled. (2) plaintiff is awarded damages of $1,212.80, interest at the rate of 10% per
annum from December 1, 1989, and his court costs. (3) Since the provisions of the Federal
Act also apply to state actions (see § 1989), plaintiff is awarded $1,500.00 attorney's fees.
(4) No punitive damages are awarded.
Stated \SYV2>

^T*4»

4&j <tf Nwssstoes, \992.

L. H Griffifys, Circuit Judge
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James C. Haskins (1406)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
5085 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 268-3994
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, SifeT ^KE^&OUNTY
MURRAY DEPARTMENT

MARK ERICKSON,
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 903000298

E.Z. STREET AUTO,
Defendant.

This matter came on for trial on September 29, 1992 and
October 19, 1992 before the Honorable Leroy H. Griffiths, Judge
of The Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County,
Murray Department.
The plaintiff, Mark Erickson, appeared in person and through
his attorney, James C. Haskins and Jeff Hollingworth.

The

defendant, E.Z. Street Auto, appeared in person and through its
attorney, John D. Russell.

Evidence was produced by each of the

parties through testimony and exhibits.

At the conclusion of the

presentation of testimony and exhibits, both parties rested.

The

court having heard all the evidence and being fully advised in
the premises now makes its findings of fact and conclusions of
law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In September 1989, Defendant E.Z. Street Auto offered a

fx

1980 Volkswagen camper van ("Vehicle") for sale.
2.

On or about September 26, 1989, Plaintiff purchased the

Vehicle from Defendant.
3.

Plaintiff agreed to pay a total purchase price of

$4,291.00 ($4,266.00, plus $25.00 for an out of state permit).
Plaintiff paid for the Vehicle's purchase using two credit cards.
.Plaintiff charged $1,291.00 on his American Express card and
$3,000.00 on his Visa card.
4.

Approximately one week prior to purchasing the Vehicle,

Plaintiff test drove the Vehicle accompanied by one of
Defendant's salesman, Paul Lives.
5.

While on the test drive, Plaintiff stopped at his

father-in-law's home and Plaintiff's wife and father-in-law
inspected the Vehicle.

At this time the odometer indicated that

the mileage on the Vehicle was approximately 48,800 miles.
6.

Even though the Vehicle was relatively old, given the

low mileage shown on the odometer and the condition of the body,
the three felt that the Vehicle was in good condition.
7.

Plaintiff and Mr. Lives discussed the mileage shown on

the odometer.

Plaintiff testified that Mr. Lives told Plaintiff

that the miles shown were the actual miles. Mr. Lives testified
that he told Plaintiff to have the Vehicle checked by a mechanic
because there was no way to determine the actual mileage on a car
that old.
8.

During the week prior to the Vehicle's purchase,

Plaintiff spoke with Defendant's manager, Ronald Memmott,
2
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regarding purchase terms.

Both plaintiff and his wife testified

that Mr. Memmott told them that the 48,831 miles, as shown on the
Vehicle's odometer, were the actual miles of the Vehicle.
9.

On September 26, 1989, Mr. Memmott, on behalf of

Defendant, finalized the Vehicle's purchase with Plaintiff.
10.

Mr. Memmott prepared all of the necessary documents

transferring ownership of the Vehicle to Plaintiff.
11.

Mr. Memmott prepared the Purchase Agreement on which he

indicated the Vehicle's mileage as 48,831.
12.

Mr. Memmott prepared the Odometer Disclosure Statement

which stated in pertinent part:
I E.Z. Street Auto state that the odometer . . . now
reads 48,831 (no tenths) miles and to the best of my
knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the
Vehicle . . . unless one of the following statements is
checked.
(1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge
the odometer reading reflects the amount of mileage in
excess of its mechanical limits.
(2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT
the actual mileage. WARNING ODOMETER DISCREPANCY.
13.

Mr. Memmott checked statement (2) and at trial denied

that he misrepresented the mileage of the Vehicle to Plaintiff,
even though he knew that the actual mileage was far in excess of
48,831 miles. When statement (2) was checked, people were put on
notice that there was an odometer discrepancy.
14.

Plaintiff bought the Vehicle "as is" and signed

statements that he realized the Vehicle was sold without any
warranties.
15.

Plaintiff drove the Vehicle to his home in Evanston,

Wyoming and during the first week of operation he repaired the
3

brakes, tail lights, and door locks, and installed a new door
rear-view mirror, all at a cost of $123.24.
16.

At the beginning of the second week, Plaintiff, his

wife, and their one year old daughter left Evanston to drive to
Los Angeles, California.
17.

Approximately 80 miles north of Las Vegas, Nevada the

.Vehicle broke down and had to be towed to Las Vegas.
18.

While in Las Vegas, Plaintiff was told by a Volkswagen

repair shop that the engine needed a complete overhaul at an
estimated cost of $2,000.00.

He was also told that from the

condition of the engine it was evident that the actual mileage
was greatly in excess of the mileage figure shown on the
odometer.
19.

So as not to ruin their trip to California, plaintiff

rented a car in Las Vegas and continued traveling to Los Angeles.
On their return trip, Plaintiff rented a truck large enough to
tow the Camper Van and brought it back to his father-in-law's
home in South Salt Lake, Utah.

It cost $150.34 to rent the car

and $939.22 to rent the truck.
20.

The father-in-law, who is an experienced Volkswagen

mechanic, disassembled part of the engine in an attempt to repair
it.

The engine showed evidence of many miles of use, and he

determined that a complete engine overhaul was necessary.
21.

Plaintiff's negotiations to have the defendant repair

the engine were unsuccessful.

Defendant insisted that under it's

"as-is, no warranty" contract it had no legal obligation to
4

repair the engine.
22.

Plaintiff, upon finding an old registration form,

discovered the name of the previous owners of the 1980 van.

They

informed him that the actual mileage of the van, when they sold
it, was 146,811 miles.
23.

Plaintiff testified that he would not have purchased

the Vehicle "as is, no warranty" if he had known the mileage was
over 100,000 miles.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The U.S. Congress stated in its findings of the Federal

Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1981-1991 ("Federal Odometer Statute"), that purchasers, when
buying motor Vehicles, rely heavily on .the odometer reading as an
index of the condition and value of such Vehicle; that purchasers
are entitled to rely on the odometer reading as an accurate
reflection of the mileage actually traveled by the Vehicle; that
an accurate indication of the mileage traveled by a motor Vehicle
assists the purchaser in determining its safety and reliability.
2.

In actions brought under the Federal Odometer Statute,

courts have enforced strict accountability on any person
transferring ownership of a Vehicle.

The standard of proof in

actions based on violation of the Federal Odometer Statute
include action taken with reckless disregard, as well as action
taken with the specific intent to deceive or cheat potential
purchasers.

See, Ryan v. Edwards, 592 F.2d 756 (1979); Havnes v.

Manning, 917 F.2d 450 (1990).
5

3.

In Utah, it is recognized that the mileage on the

odometer of a used a car is a factor which is likely to affect
the judgment of the buyer and has pecuniary significance.

State

v. Forshee, 588 P 2d, 181. Plaintiff testified that he would
have made a different deal, or no deal at all, had he known
Vehicle's actual mileage.
4.

There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether

Defendant's salesman and manager told Plaintiff that the
Vehicle's mileage was 100,000 miles less than the actual mileage.
However, the court concludes that from January, 1989, Defendant's
agents knew or should have known that the odometer had "turned
over" and that the actual mileage was 100,000 miles more than as
shown on the odometer.
5.

This information was not given to the plaintiff.

Mr.

Memmott should have checked statement (1), and written the actual
mileage on the Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase
Agreement.
[W]hen a transferor knows that a vehicle's odometer has
"turned over" after registering 99,999 miles, the
"cumulative mileage" which must be stated to satisfy the
requirements of (the Act) is the total of 100,000 plus the
number actually appearing on the odometer."
Ryan v. Edwards, 592 P2d 760.
6.

What the agents did do was to profess ignorance as to

the actual mileage.

Such conduct mislead the plaintiff and

constitutes reckless disregard for the truth if not actual intent
to defraud.
7.

The court concludes that Defendant, through the actions
6
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of its agents, committed fraud on the plaintiff.
8.

Plaintiff should be granted judgment against the

defendant as follows:
(1) The Purchase Agreement should be rescinded.
Plaintiff's obligation, as evidenced by the credit card charges,
should be cancelled;
(2) Plaintiff should be awarded damages of $1,212.80,
interest at the rate of 10% per annum from December 1, 1989, and
his court costs of $104.00;
(3) Since the provisions of the Federal Act also apply
to state actions (see § 1989), Plaintiff should be awarded
$1,500.00 attorney's fees.
(4) No punitive damages should be awarded.

DATED this

day of / ^ V ^ X ^ v ^ ^ w ^

, 1993.

By the Court:

L. H Griff iths/A£/ircuit Judge
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James C. Haskins (1406)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
5085 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 268-3994
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY
MURRAY DEPARTMENT

MARK ERICKSON,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
Civil No. 903000298

E.Z. STREET AUTO,
Defendant.

This matter came on for trial on September 29, 1992 and
October 19, 1992 before the Honorable Leroy H. Griffiths, Judge
of The Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County,
Murray Department and the court having made its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff is granted judgment against the Defendant;

2.

The Purchase Agreement is rescinded;

3.

Plaintiff's obligation, as evidenced by the credit card

charges, is cancelled;
4.

Plaintiff is awarded damages of $1,212.80, plus

interest at the rate of 10% per annum from December 1, 1989 until
paid in full.
5.

Plaintiff is awarded his court costs of $104.00;

n

COURT

6.

Plaintiff is awarded $1,500.00 attorney's fees.

7.

Plaintiff is not awarded any punitive damages.

DATED this

/><M day of <^^J\A*ULO+*I

1993.

By theJ2o\rtft: -^

L. H Griffiths/l/Circuit Judge
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